Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Marginal Gains's avatar

Excellent post!

I think this story again goes beyond one individual, or even this specific fund failure. That said, I am not sure all the details are out yet, so it is probably worth waiting for more information before forming final opinions. The following may therefore be incomplete or wrong in places, but my current read is that this episode reflects something broader, or even this specific fund failure.

We increasingly live in a "high risk, high reward" culture where extreme bets can feel rational because the ordinary path to wealth feels broken for many people. However, in this case, many of the investors in a fund like this were probably not ordinary people betting rent money or a paycheck. They were likely wealthy individuals, tech insiders, institutions, or people with enough capital to spread bets across many high-risk opportunities. For them, backing Leopold may have been a portfolio-style moonshot: one allocation among many, where losing some or all of it was acceptable if the upside was exponential.

The wealthy can diversify across moonshots. Most people cannot. For ordinary people, the same "high risk, high reward" mentality can become much more dangerous because they lack the same cushion, access, and ability to survive losses.

As you said, Leopold is still responsible for the fund's risk management. If you run a concentrated, leveraged vehicle and it gets forced into liquidation, that is a structural failure, not just bad luck. This situation also reminded me of Long-Term Capital Management and When Genius Failed, one of my favorite books. The lesson there was also not that intelligence is useless, but that intelligence plus leverage, concentration, and overconfidence can still end in disaster.

Since this is not the first time it has happened, we seem to learn very little from the past. We either convince ourselves that "this time is different," or that a system as complex as the stock market can be understood by a single genius, in this case, or by a group of geniuses, as with LTCM. I think history is often more useful for showing us what not to do than for giving us a perfect template for what to do, because each era has its own details, narratives, and sources of overconfidence.

Being right about AI or compute demand in the long term does not mean the portfolio was built to survive the short term. However, investors also knowingly bought into the structure. They wanted convexity. They wanted exposure to the exponential AI thesis. If the fund was one of many speculative bets in a broader portfolio, then they were not necessarily naive victims; they were participating in a high-upside, high-fragility trade.

The broader issue is that this mentality is becoming more common across society: prediction markets, crypto, YOLO options, AI infrastructure trades, startup-lottery thinking, and creator-economy speculation all reflect the same mood.

Additionally, insider information, networks, media hype, I remember a WSJ article from a few months ago about Leopold and how well his fund was doing, leverage providers, regulators, and the people/company willing to buy once things go wrong, all of whom are part of the system, though responsible to very different degrees. The incentives of each player may differ, but together they help create the conditions for such blowups. Part of the problem is that no one seems willing to wait 10 or 20 years to figure out whether an investor's success comes from real skill, luck, or some combination of the two. A few great years are quickly turned into a genius narrative, especially when the thesis matches the dominant market story of the moment. However, in this case, it was not even a few years.

Still, we should not learn the wrong lesson: "never take risks." Without risk, most people will never save or compound enough to meaningfully change their position. The lesson may be to seek convexity and avoid ruin. Rich investors can often afford to play that game across many bets. Ordinary people usually cannot. That difference is what makes stories like this both fascinating and unsettling.

Michael Spencer's avatar

You wouldn't be wrong to call this an Anthropic insider Hedge fund. I mean, it's like part of the family.

3 more comments...

No posts

Ready for more?